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Causal explanations of corruption and governance abound in the 
literature, as well as studies about the effects upon outcomes such as economic 
growth, political equilibrium and social equality. When countries are confronted 
with failed reforms and corruption scandals, this can aggravate the economic 
crisis. 
European countries vary enormously in the extent to which politicians 
or public officials abuse their powers for private gain. In this context, of greater 
intellectual interest are those methods or strategies by which one could tackle 
the challenge of reform in order to reduce the severity of corruption. In this 
regard, this article aims to shape and improve the literature that deals with 
corruption and provides ways to reduce this widespread phenomenon.  
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Corruption is generally regarded as one of the most significant 
drawbacks to development. The theoretical literature shows that corruption is 
negatively correlated with economic outcomes and reduces growth by keeping 
private investment at low levels (Lederman, et all., 2005). Moreover, far from 
being eradicated, corruption has insinuated itself into the complex relations 
between state and market, endangering the mechanisms of political consensus 
formation and enhancing the crisis of political activism (Porta and Vannucci, 
1999).  
Furthermore, the literature on corruption has expanded rapidly due to 
the fact that this phenomenon has become a central problem of European 
economic environment and politics. The theoretical literature in political 
science, sociology and economics has made numerous attempts not only to 
define corruption but also to shape and explain the patterns of this 
phenomenon. In this regard, it is important to understand both the 
determinants of corruption and the effects that they impose upon politics and 
more generally upon society (Lederman, Loayza and Soares, 2005).  
The present article sets out an assessment framework by reviewing the 
theoretical work that has been undertaken in this field. The objective is to 
provide a structure for two distinct areas of analysis: the first one focuses upon 
the classical and modern notions of corruption, whereas the second gives 
particular attention to the literature which has as focal point the setup of 
different remedies against corruption (e.g. anti-corruption agencies). Finally, the 
third part analyses the relationship between politicians, political parties and their 
role in corrupt exchanges. This article, therefore, seeks to identify a design that 
is appropriate for the corruption empirical investigation, eliminating in this way 
any distortions and uncertainties for future researches. 
 
A Search for Definitions 
 
The question what constitutes ‘corruption’ has long been a feature of 
conceptual and political debates. Classical conceptions of corruption with 
broader meaning have given way to modern definitions in which specific actions 
are measured with a diversity of standards. Nevertheless, the modern meaning 
of the term has not yet managed to settle the matter: the question what 
constitutes ‘corruption’ still promises scholarly debates and political disputes 
(Johnston, 1996).  
At this point it is important to mention that the classical notion of 
corruption is centered upon the moral vitality of society at large, and for 
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scholars such as Thucydides or Machiavelli (cited by Johnston, 1996:322) the 
term ‘corruption’ refer less to individual action and more to the distribution of 
power in society, to the relationship between leaders and followers and to the 
rulers’ sources of power. In contrast, modern interpretations of corruption have 
become narrower while the scope of politics in contemporary society has 
broadened. As a result, for most participants in political life, corruption now 
refers to the actions of those holding public positions and (according to some 
definitions) of those who seek to influence them (Johnston, 1996.  
Much of the contemporary literature on corruption has followed 
Heidenheimer’s distinction between public-office centered, public-interest 
centered and market-centered definitions of corruption (Heywood, 1997). The 
public office view of corruption is best exemplified by J.S. Nye (cited by Philip, 
1997: 440):  
 
“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary 
or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private 
regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to 
pervert the judgments of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding 
uses)”.  
 
Nye explicitly excludes public interest from his definition in order to 
avoid confusing the phenomenon with its results. Others, however, have 
defined corruption precisely in terms of public interest. Carl Friedrich (cited by 
Philip, 1997: 440) argues that corruption emerges when a power-holder, e.g. an 
office holder or public manager, is by monetary or other illegal reward 
motivated to undertake actions which favors whoever provides the illegal 
payment and therefore does damage to public interest.  
Finally, market-centered definitions can offer an alternative explanation 
for the incidence of corruption. In the view of Jacob van Klaveren, (cited by 
Philip, 1997:444) market-centered corruption means that an office-holder will 
use his or her authority to obtain illegal income from the public. In this regard, 
corruption refers to those civil servants who treat their offices as a business, 
seeking to maximize their income. The office then becomes a “maximizing 
unit”. Nevertheless, as Mark Philip points out (Philip, 1997: 445), not all cases 
of income or interest maximizing need to be corrupt. Hence, one must address 
the construction of public-interest and public-office which are based on 
principles external to the market-model in order to be able to point out those 
cases of interest/income maximizing which are also politically corrupt. 
Moreover, the public-office and public-interest definitions are closely related. 
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Public offices are generally perceived as structured through principles and values 
that demand all civil servants to be guided by considerations of the public 
interest (Philip, 1997: 445).  
 
Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies 
 
When defining corruption as the abuse of public power for private 
gains, it should be noted that whatever the academic debates concerning this 
definition are, its manifestations range from the acceptance of money or other 
illegal payments for awarding contracts to pay-offs for legislative support or 
intervention in the justice process. Forms of corruption also include 
overpricing, establishing non-existing projects or tax assessment frauds       
(United Nation, 1989:4 cited by Doing, 1995:152).  
The extraction of illegal benefits by politicians and public officials 
through the abuse of their powers, and the exacerbation of such conducts have 
been documented in the literature on politics, modernization and economic 
development (see Huntington, 1968; Scott, 1972; Clapham, 1982; Clarke, 1983; 
Williams, 1987; Theobald, 1990). In line with this, combating corruption is 
perceived throughout the literature as crucially important: corrupt activities can 
potentially destroy all types of governmental policies and programs, hinder 
development  and  negatively  impact  individuals  and  social  groups             
(United Nations, 1990, p.4 cited by Doing, 1995, 152).   
Regarding the types of corruption control, Kate Gillespie and Gwenn 
Okruklik, in their paper, The Political Dimension of Corrupt Cleanups (1991:6) have 
classified the measures of controlling corruption into the following. Societal 
strategies emphasize ethical norms, education and public vigilance. There is a 
general agreement among scholars that no clean up measure can be effective if 
society as whole does not accept and promote certain standards of behavior 
regarding public property and fairness  
Legal strategies and legal codes that prohibit corrupt activities are to 
be found in almost all countries. Generally speaking, public official’s activities’ 
are shaped through rules which encompass the collection of political founds, the 
acceptance of gifts, the disclosure of assets and liabilities and conflict of interest. 
However, legal sanctions are effective only in the presence of complementary 
strategies: increased penalties for corruption, the existence of independent 
auditing and investigative institutions, the existence of an independent justice 
system, and the determination of the government to curb corruption 
(Shackleton and McMullen cited by Gillespie and Okruklik, 1991:6).  
Many scholars have assessed market strategies, and their argument is 
that corruption is enhanced by government intervention in economy and 
bureaucratic inertia. In these conditions, the outcome will be disequilibrium 
between supply and demand for goods and services, and the cases where 
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demand surmounts supply are conducive to corrupt activity. The prescribed 
strategy in order to clean up corruption is to simply allow market forces to 
operate without governmental intervention.  
Political strategies promote the elimination of corrupt activities by 
directing attention upon three concerns: authority, access to political process 
and administrative reforms. Regarding the authority, one tactic is to place key 
decision in the hands of committees instead of an individual. Moreover, 
opportunities to engage in corrupt activities would be diminished if all laws were 
made more precisely, allowing nothing to the discretion of authorities. 
According to Kate Gillespie and Gwenn Okruklik, another strategy to clean up 
corruption concentrates upon maximizing public access to the decision-making 
process. Additionally, some scholars suggest that a substantial participation of 
citizens in the political processes prevents official agencies from becoming 
isolated and hence, reduces politicians’ opportunities to raise or obtain illegal 
benefits. Finally, those who argue in favor of administrative reform emphasize 
the  discouragement  of  corrupt  behavior  by  increasing  the  benefits  of             
non-corrupt conduct (e.g. increased salaries, pensions, training) and a mutual 
antagonistic surveillance between government agencies (Gillespie and Okruklik, 
1991:8).  
As a part of political and legal strategies, the establishment of anti-
corruption agencies has become one of the best-known government responses 
in recent decades. The history of anti-corruption agencies starts in the early 
1950s when Singapore created an anti-corruption commission and continued 
with the Hong Kong Bureau and the New South Wales Independent 
Commission. The fact that this type of institution is relatively new can be 
explained through the fact that corruption became broadly recognized as an 
important dysfunction of public administration only in the 20
th century 
(Meagher, 2004:70). Furthermore, the literature regards the Hong Kong and the 
New South Wales anti-corruption agencies as successful examples for the 
establishment of strong, centralized agencies in the field.  
The first model, the Hong Kong ICAC, has enjoyed since its creation in 
1974, a continuous success. This agency controls corruption through the means 
of investigation, prevention and community relations. However, when first 
established, the ICAC had a limited effectiveness; nevertheless, the repatriation 
and the successful prosecution of Peter Godber (high police officer) increased 
the agency’s credibility. From that moment, the ICAC has built an impressive 
record of investigations and convictions (Heilbrunn, 2004). The second 
example, the New South Wales ICAC, was established in 1987, when the 
political leaders decided to create an agency similar to the Hong Kong model 
but  with  a  crucial  difference:  the  new  agency  emphasized  prevention.           
After beginning its activity, the NWS ICAC managed to build the public trust 
through a mixed record of successful prosecutions; its major contribution is 
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that, through prevention, it managed to change the norms of how business is 
conducted in the New South Wales (Heilbrunn, 2004) 
Concerning what constitutes the activity of an anti-corruption agency, 
this article assumes the definition provided by Patrick Meagher (2004:70): the 
primary function of an independent and separate agency is to provide 
centralized leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity. This includes 
policy analysis and technical assistance, monitoring, investigation and 
prosecution. Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all anti-corruption 
agencies have these functions: they might differ upon national characteristics 
(e.g. political system).  
Furthermore, according to some scholars (e.g. S.N. Sangita), in 
developing countries the establishment of institutions designed to control 
corruption is often quite inadequate: sometimes these agencies are created in the 
absence of a clear understanding of the nature and causes of corruption. 
Likewise, where there is a lack of strong political and administrative will to 
effectively undertake corruption, the anti-corruption institutions are rather 
ineffective  (Sangita, 1995:46).  
 
The Political Dimension of Corruption:  
Parties and Their Role 
 
In general, in any society, the individual political behavior and political 
outcomes are constrained by political institutions (Persson and Tabellini 2003 
cited by Pande, 2007: 5). The structure for collective decision-making is 
provided through political institutions, which defines the context for public 
goods provision and resource distribution by the governments. In this 
framework, the democratic political process (i.e. elections) that gives citizens the 
ability to dismiss corrupt politicians represents an important potential constraint 
to corruption (Pande, 2007: 5). However, aside this mechanism, the 
democratization must be supported through the existence of powerful 
institutions capable to fight corruption (Amundsen, 1999:21).  
Political corruption (i.e. the misuse of public office for private gain) 
encountered at high institutional level is perceived in the literature as being far 
more damaging in democracies than in any other forms of political systems. The 
argument is that corruption is more detrimental to democracies than to               
non-democracies: by attacking some of the essential principles on which 
democracy rests, e.g. the equality of citizens before institutions or the openness 
of decision making, corruption contributes to the delegitimation of the political 
system in which it takes root (Heywood, 1997). What is worse, the elite and the 
political parties often choose to transform corruption into an established 
practice, guaranteeing at the same time the continuity of the system no matter 
the administrative changes.  Therefore, any future research should pay particular 
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attention to the specific mechanisms through which political elites and parties 
shape the rules of anti-corruption fight.  
This article adopts Donatella de la Porta and Alberto Vannucci’s 
approach (2000:26), which sustains that politicians involved in corrupt activities 
rarely hide their enterprises from their own party. As a consequence, parties play 
an important “hidden” role in organizing corrupt activities, i.e. the collection of 
bribes, by ensuring compliance through a widespread control of public 
administration. Besides framing corruption as “normal business”, parties have 
the  power  to  shape  the  fight  against  corruption  (e.g.  voting  behavior).           
This raises a more specific question about the political will to engage in the 
institutional building of anti-corruption agencies. While the existence of free 
elections and a pluralistic system of representation are critical for the effective 
functioning of democracy, the key agents – political parties- have been 
increasingly implicated in corruption scandals in many Eastern countries       
(Pujas, Rhodes, 1998:18). 
The establishment of good governance, the control of rent-seeking and 
corruption are widely accepted throughout the literature as critical elements in 
securing a stable economical development (Goudie, Stasavage, 1998:423). By 
reviewing the literature that has been undertaken in this field, this article sets out 
a framework within which the problem of corruption can be analyzed. To sum 
up, the beginning of the article has critically assessed a number of different 
attempts to define corruption. Furthermore, the second part explored different 
anti-corruption strategies, and in particular, the role of anti-corruption agencies. 
Finally, the article raised the readers’ attention to political parties as potentially 
the most important political structures in determining the incidence of 
corruption within any democratic government.  
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